In this paper we examine the proposition that small investor sentiment, measured by the change in the discount/premium on closed-end funds, is an important factor in stock returns. We conduct an out-ofsample test of the investor sentiment hypothesis in a market environment that is more likely to be prone to investor sentiment than the U.S.. We fail to provide supporting evidence of the claim of Lee, Shleifer, and Thaler (1991) that investor sentiment affects the risk of common stocks. Consistent with Elton, Gruber, and Busse (1998), who show that investor sentiment does not enter the return generating process, our tests do not detect investor sentiment in a capital market that is more susceptible to small investor sentiment. Our results provide additional support against the claim that investor sentiment represents an independent and systematic asset pricing risk.
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I. Introduction
The closed-end fund puzzle has been the focus of several past studies because, on the average, the closed-end fund trades at a discount from the value of its assets it holds, to NAV. 1 Consistent with Zweig's (1973) early explanation for the closed-end fund puzzle, Lee, Shleifer, and Thaler (1991) , show that the closed-end fund discount reflects investor sentiment and, therefore, it affects the equity risk premium.
2 Lee et al. (1991) also argue that the investor sentiment factor has more bearing on the return pattern of closed-end funds and small cap stocks.
In a more recent study, Elton, Gruber, and Busse (1998) refute the Lee et al. (1991) argument that stock prices are influenced by the investor sentiment factor. Elton et al. (1998) argue that the investor sentiment explanation for the closed-end fund discount proposed by Lee et al. (1991) , is based on the misspecification of the return generating process. 3 In this paper, we use a unique dataset to examine whether the investor sentiment, measured by the change in the discount on closed-end funds, enters the return generating process of common stocks, and especially, if closed-end funds, shown to be very sensitive to this factor by Lee et al. (1991) , yield a higher return to compensate for the risk associated with the erratic and unpredictable nature of investor sentiment. While Elton et al. (1998) , provide evidence against the idea that investor sentiment is priced in the U.S. capital market, it cannot be ruled out that this result is limited to the U.S market. Without testing the robustness of these findings outside the environment in which they were discovered, it remains unclear whether these empirical results are merely spurious correlations that they may not be confirmed outside the U.S capital market. Especially, in a market with different institutional, trading, maturity, and composition of private and institutional investors than that of the U.S.. Fama (1998) in his response to a number of his critiques, who have challenged the rationality of capital markets, argues that studies uncovering market return anomalies should stand up to out-of-sample tests.
He also argues that most of capital market anomalies tend to disappear after the publication of the original studies and, therefore, they should stand up to different sample period tests as well. This paper fills a gap in the literature in this respect.
Using Greek data over the period January 1997 to January 2002, we expect to shed more light on whether investor sentiment is an important factor in asset pricing and shun the criticism that observed empirical regularities arise from data mining. The choice of the Greek closed-end funds is also appealing on several other grounds. First, as shown in Figure 1 , the Greek capital market experienced both a boom and a bust face during the 1997-2002 period. The unprecedented price run up lasted until August 1999, while stock prices reverted to historical mean levels by January 2002. During the first period the Athens Stock Exchange index (FTSE20) rose from about 550 to more than 3000 points, while by January 2002 was below the 1500 points. Hence, investor sentiment should be more pronounced in such a stock market environment. In addition, this dataset allows us to examine whether the creation of new closedend funds was more prevalent during its first face, apparently, characterized by investor optimism.
[Insert Figure 1 About Here] Second, the Greek capital market is not as mature and sophisticated as the U.S. and/or more developed European capital markets. Consequently, if investor sentiment does play a role in asset pricing, its manifestation should be greater in the Greek capital market than in other developed capital markets. That is, investor sentiment (human emotions) should have a greater bearing on investment decisions and the determination of asset price in this type of financial environment. Third, to the extent that investor sentiment is primarily a trait of small investors, it should also be more pronounced in markets where small investors play a more prominent role than institutional investors. Institutional investors in the Greek capital market environment are far less important than in the more developed capital markets. Institutional investments represented 6% of the total market capitalization of the Athens Stock Exchange (ASE) over the 1994-2002 period. 4 Moreover, noise traders are expected to be more prevalent in a market with a brief history of strong investor interest in equity investing.
Finally, what is even more interesting and distinct about Greek closed-end funds is that they have been trading at a premium for most of the 1997-2002 period. Figure 2 illustrates that 3 closed-end funds were selling, on the average, 7.55% above their NAV and at 122.86% premium when the stock market peaked in August 1999. 5 Therefore, it would not be an exaggeration to argue that the Greek capital market offers the opportunity to study the investor sentiment phenomenon in an environment where is more likely to exist. If our tests fail to produce evidence in support of the investor sentiment factor, it would be reasonable to conclude that it is not important in explaining the risk of common stocks.
[Insert Figure 2 About Here]
The main results of the paper are as follows. First, we find no evidence in support of the claim of Lee, Shleifer, and Thaler (1991) that investor sentiment affects the risk of common stocks. Our evidence is consistent with the findings of Elton et al. (1998) and indicates that investor sentiment does not exist even in a market whose environment was expected to be more prone to investor sentiment than in other developed markets. Second, while we show similar results with those reported by Lee et al. (1991) when we use their two-factor model, our evidence reveals that the sentiment factor does not enter the return generating process more frequently than a set of industry return indices constructed in a similar way as the sentiment return index.
The industry return indices are used as a benchmark of comparison since they are not considered as systematic asset pricing factors. Third, when we investigate the pattern of return sensitivity to the sentiment return factor (i.e., the change in the discount closed-end funds) across size portfolios using the same two-factor model used by Lee et al. (1991) , we are able to produce similar results with theirs. When we use a more general multifactor model, this pattern ceases to exist. Finally, we examine whether closed-end funds (i.e., firms that are expected to be more sensitive to the sentiment factor) earn a higher return as expected according to the claim of Lee et al. (1991) . Our evidence suggests that firms with higher sensitivity to change in the discount on closed-end funds do not associate with higher returns.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section II provides a description of the data sources, portfolio samples, and index construction. In Section III we describe the return generating process and the tests. Section IV presents the results. Section V concludes the paper.
5 While U.S. funds at times sell at premia to their NAV, usually when they start trading, a 10-20% discount has been the norm.
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II. Data Sources, Portfolios, and Index Construction
In this section we describe the data sources, portfolio samples, index construction and define the variables used in the analysis.
A. Data Sources
We employ data obtained from several different sources spanning the period from January 1997 to January 2002. The sample consists of all 16 Greek closed-end funds listed in the Athens Stock Exchange since January 1997. Even though most closed-end funds went public before 1997, as shown in the Panel A of the Appendix, our sample is restricted to the postJanuary 1997 period mainly because NAV data are not available for prior years. All closed-end funds went public prior to 1995, that is generally characterized as a rather dull period for the ASE. This is inconsistent with the investor sentiment hypothesis that predicts that new funds get started when investor sentiment is strong. In fact, not a single new closed-end fund was offered for trading during the post-1997 period when the ASE experienced a remarkable price run up and old funds were selling at hefty premiums. The portfolio composition of each fund was determined from the quarterly financial statements of the funds. Ownership structure of Greek closed-end funds was collected from a special report published by the ASE. This publication reports the owners of common shares (or voting rights) that hold at least 5% of total shares as of 31 December 2001 for all companies listed in ASE.
B. Portfolio Samples
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We test the proposition that the investor sentiment (i.e., the index of changes in the value weighted index of premium/discount) enters the return generating process for a set of (a) 6 passive portfolios and an extra 5 size-based portfolios, (b) 23 active portfolios, and (c) 61 industrial stocks and one utility stock. The passive portfolios are the three indices of the Athens Stock Exchange (FTSE20, FTSE40, PARALLEL) and three equally weighted portfolios of industrial stocks sorted by size (LARGE, MEDIUM, SMALL). Consistent with previous work, a more refined set of size-shorted portfolios are constructed (P1(large), P2, P3, P4, and P5 (small)) to allow us to make comparisons with prior studies. FTSE20, is the value-weighted index of 20 blue chips traded in the ASE (i.e., the large-cap stock index). FTSE40, is the valueweighted index of the next 40 companies in the ASE (i.e., the medium-cap stock index). GI-ASE, is the value-weighted portfolio of 60 stocks from the main market traded in the ASE.
PARALLEL, is the value-weighted portfolio of 42 stocks traded in the parallel market of the ASE. The LARGE, MEDIUM, and SMALL represent equally-weighted portfolios. These portfolios were constructed by ranking industrial and utility stocks at the end of each year in descending order based on their market capitalization. The top 20 stocks are used to form the LARGE portfolio, the next 20 stocks the MEDIUM portfolio and the bottom 22 stocks form the SMALL portfolio. Then, equally weighted monthly returns are estimated for each of these portfolios for the sample period. The set of active portfolios consists of 23 equity mutual funds, 61 industrial stocks and one utility stock. (i.e., OTE, a telecommunications company). Appendix A, provides the 16 closed-end funds, 23 active portfolios and the 62 industrial and utility stocks used in this study. where, 7 It should be noted here that we estimate closed-end fund premiums rather than discounts, as is the case in Lee, Shleifer, and Thaler (1991) and Elton, Gruber, and Busse (1998) , so that we can obtain a positive sentiment index. Other than that the construction of our sentiment index is identical to these studies. Therefore, when the index increases (decreases) indicates investor optimism (pessimism). In addition, we computed the changes in the value-weighted index of monthly premiums:
C. Index Construction and Description of Variables
A. Premiums/Discounts, Closed-end Fund Returns, and NAV Returns [Insert Table 3 About Here]
C. Correlations in Premiums/ Discounts of Closed-end funds
The investor sentiment hypothesis predicts that the discounts/premiums on closed-end funds should be correlated. (7) closed-end funds. The average pairwise correlation is 0.516. This is similar to the correlation reported in Lee et al. (1991) . The correlation between the VWPR and the individual premiums of each individual fund is also very high an indication of the strong comovement among premiums in individual closed-end funds.
[Insert Table 4 and 4a About Here] While these correlations are not statistically insignificant, the correlation between ∆VWPR and the returns on the value-weighted index FTSE40 is 0.5019 and the returns on the value-weighted index from the PARALLEL market is 0.5577. This indicates that closed-end fund premiums are correlated more with medium capitalization stocks included in the FTSE40 index and with small cap stocks traded in the PARALLEL market where investor sentiment is more likely to exist than in the other segments of the ASE. Overall, these movements do not clearly support the existence of investor sentiment.
[Insert Table 5 and 5a About Here]
III. Investor Sentiment and the Return Generating Process
To examine whether investors require an extra return because they are exposed to small investor sentiment risk, the sentiment factor should be priced (i.e., enter the return generating process with a significant coefficient) and the average alpha on traded securities should be different from zero. We test the Lee et al. (1991) investor sentiment hypothesis using two different models. As in Lee et al. (1991) , the first model (1) examines the relation between returns (for individual stocks and portfolios) against the market return and the change in the value-weighted index of premium: Moreover, if the investor sentiment is systematic, we need to compare its importance in the return generating process to a set of factors that most researchers believe that are not priced.
As in Elton et al. (1998) , we consider industry return indices as the natural candidates. Hence, the second test is designed to examine the relevance of sentiment in the return generating process by comparing how often it is significant in time-series estimates of this process relative to a set of sector-return indices. This test is conducted using model (2). The returns of four sectoral indices of the ASE (i.e., banking, industrial, construction and holding) are included along with the market and sentiment factors. These indices were selected because they (1) represent the largest number of firms in our stock sample, (2) were available for the entire period of the study and (3) stand for the mainstream of companies in the Greek economy traded in the ASE:
the market-value weighted return on sectoral index j in month t minus the one-month interbank offered rate 9 The holding sector consists of companies whose assets are made up of shares of other companies. These companies do not have any industrial or commercial activity and are known as "symmetoxon" in Greek. 10 The OTE stock is the only utility stock traded in the ASE during the entire time period of the study. Table 6 presents regression results for models (4) [Insert Table 6 About Here]
IV. Empirical Evidence
A. The Significance of Sentiment in Portfolio Returns
B. Sentiment and Size
To assess the contribution of a set of industry returns to the return generating process requires to examine whether they influence the returns of size sorted stock portfolios.
11 Lee et al. (1991) argue that focusing on portfolios of firms with different capitalizations permits a more accurate testing of the sentiment hypothesis. Specifically, they argue that sentiment should affect mostly stocks held by individual investors. Small cap stocks and mutual funds are the perfect candidates to test the sentiment hypothesis. In this subsection, we present evidence based on size sorted portfolios. The portfolios of stocks we consider are three size-ranked portfolios (LARGE CAP, MEDIUM CAP and SMALL CAP). The LARGE CAP portfolio consists of one third of all stocks with the largest equity value on ASE, the MEDIUM CAP portfolio is made up of the next one third of stocks while the SMALL CAP portfolio represents the remaining fraction of small capitalization stocks. Consistent with previous work, a more refined set of size-shorted portfolios is constructed (P1(large), P2, P3, P4, and P5 (small)) to allow us to make comparisons with prior studies. Table 7 presents the results of time series regressions of returns of each size portfolio on the change in the premium of closed-end funds (∆VWPR) and the market excess return (GIASE) (model 1). In this table we also report results for the six-index regression (model 2). As shown in Panel A, the relationship between the ∆VWPR and returns on size portfolios is significant at the 5 percent level in all first three regressions. The sensitivity of the small cap portfolio on the ∆VWPR is much greater than that of the large cap portfolio. However, the goodness of fit is much smaller for small stocks (31.7%) than large stocks (82.6%). Interestingly, the alpha of the small cap portfolio is statistically significant. Moreover, all size portfolios have positive loadings on the value-weighted premium. This is inconsistent with the sentiment hypothesis that predicts that investor sentiment should be more pronounced in small stocks.
Results based on the six-index regressions (model 2), show that portfolio return sensitivities on ∆VWPR are statistically insignificant. Specifically, none of the regression coefficients of the closed-end fund premium is significant at any conventional level. However, the return of each size portfolio is significantly sensitive to at least two industry returns. In contrast with the prediction of the sentiment hypothesis, small stocks have insignificant loadings on the ∆VWPR while they exhibit significant sensitivities on all industry excess returns. The negative sign of the sentiment effect indicates that small stocks do poorly when the premiums increase. The investor sentiment hypothesis predicts the reverse relationship. That is, small stocks are expected to do better when investor optimism (closed-end fund premium) increases.
The goodness of fit for small stocks in model 2 jumps from 31.7% in the two-factor model to 69.4% in the six-factor model. Contrary to the prediction of Lee, Shleifer, and Thaler (1991) , the evidence again fails to show that the ∆VWPR has a systematic influence in the return generating process. Most importantly, is that we cannot trace any small investor sentiment even in small stocks where investor sentiment is expected to be more prevalent than in any other class of stocks.
In general, similar results are obtained based on the 5 size-shorted portfolios. These results are reported in Panel B of Table 7 . The coefficient of the ∆VWPR is mostly insignificant 12 and with the wrong sign in all regressions with the exception of the P5 (SMALL)) portfolio as shown in the last regression of model 2. It is interesting to note here that the P5 regression has the lowest explanatory power (with an adjusted R 2 = 65.9) while almost all the other 5 indices are statistically significant. The intercept is also statistically, significant (with a t-statistic = 2.23).
[Insert Table 7 About Here]
B. Sentiment in Mutual Fund Returns
According to Lee et al. (1991) investor sentiment is expected to be related to the return on mutual funds because both closed-end funds and mutual funds have low institutional owmership. Hence, additional evidence on whether the investor sentiment enters the return generating process can be inferred from mutual funds which typically, like small stocks, have high individual ownership. We replicate the previous regression analysis for 23 Greek equity mutual funds.
12
The regression results are reported in Table 8 . In general, the pattern of mutual fund return sensitivities on the ∆VWPR is broadly consistent with that of the size portfolio regressions.
When we use the two-factor model the beta estimates of the sentiment are significant at the 5 percent level in 9 out of the 23 regressions, indicating that the relationship between mutual fund returns and sentiment is much weaker relative to the one we found for the size portfolios.
However, the results are strikingly similar to the size sorted portfolios. Regressions based on model (2), that makes use of six-index returns, show once again that the coefficients of the ∆VWPR are statistically insignificant in all 23 regressions. The explanatory power of these regressions is much higher than that of the two-index model while the alphas are insignificant with one exception ( i.e., mutual fund (MF21)). These results are not consistent with the view that individual ownership drives investor sentiment. Mutual fund returns show considerably greater sensitivity to the four industry return factors than to the sentiment factor.
Overall, the size and mutual fund regression results are not consistent with the view that sentiment has a systematic influence on the return generating process of portfolios of traded assets. Moreover, our findings do not support the notion that sentiment stems from individual ownership concentration.
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[Insert Table 8 About Here]
C. Sentiment in Individual Stock Returns
We now turn our focus on the return generating process of individual stocks. Lee et al. (1991) argue that investors require a higher return because they are subject to the small investor sentiment. If sentiment does play a systematic role in explaining the time series of returns on assets, we should detect that individual stock returns have significant loadings on the ∆VWPR.
As shown in Table ( 9), when we employ the two-index model the sensitivity of individual asset returns to sentiment is significant in 28 out of the 62 regressions. The explanatory power of this model is quite low. In the case of the six-index model, while the goodness of fit improves substantially, the beta associated with sentiment is fewer times significant than in the two-index model. In fact, only 10 out of the 62 regression coefficients associated with the ∆VWPR are statistically significant. The betas for the other factors not affected by investor sentiment are more often significant than ∆VWPR. Consistent with our previous results, the betas associated with the four industry returns are more often significant than the beta associated with investor sentiment.
[Insert Table 9 About Here] Table 10 presents the number of times mutual fund and individual stock sensitivities are significant at the 5 percent level in regressions of the excess returns of portfolios and assets in the 2-and 6-factors models, respectively. The evidence clearly suggests that investor sentiment does not have a systematic influence on both industrial stock and mutual fund returns when industry return indices are included in the regressions. The industry return indices appear to have considerably greater importance in the return generating process than investor sentiment. If sentiment is related to small investor irrationality then mutual funds should be the most affected assets by sentiment. Perhaps, the more interesting result that emerges from this table is that mutual funds that are generally expected to have high individual investor ownership have insignificant loadings on investor sentiment. These findings coupled with the lack of sentiment effect in small stocks and other portfolios, presented earlier, provide strong support against the view that investors require to be compensated for investor sentiment. Overall, whether we focus on individual stocks or portfolios, the evidence corroborates the view that sentiment is not important in holding and trading individual stocks or stock portfolios when we control for the 14 market and industry effects. The ∆VWPR. is not a factor with independent influence on returns.
This is inconsistent with the prediction of the investor sentiment hypothesis. Industry return indices, however, seem to explain returns more often than investor sentiment.
[Insert Table 10 About Here]
V. Conclusion
Lee et al. (1991) argue that small investor sentiment has a distinct influence on the equity risk premium. Elton et al. (1998) , however, are the first to refute the findings of Lee et al. (1991) .
Without testing the robustness of these findings outside the environment in which they were found, it remains unclear whether these empirical results are merely spurious correlations that they may not be confirmed outside the U.S capital market. In this paper we examine the importance of investor sentiment in the return generating process outside the U.S. capital market since it cannot be ruled out that these results are limited to the U.S. Specifically, we use a unique dataset, drawn from the Greek capital market that has sharply different institutional, trading, maturity, and composition of private and institutional investors characteristics in comparison to the U.S. market, to investigate whether investor sentiment, measured by the change in the discount/premium on closed-end funds, is associated with higher returns required by investors as a compensation for being exposed to sentiment risk.
If investor sentiment is primarily a trait of small investors, as argued by Lee et al. (1991) , it should also be more pronounced in markets where small investors play a more prominent role than institutional investors. The Greek capital market is a natural candidate since institutional investors are far less important than in the U. S. and other more developed capital markets.
Moreover, in recent years the Greek capital market has experienced a dramatic price run up that is likely to be associated with strong investor sentiment and, therefore, easier to be detected than in other markets. Another unique aspect associated with the choice of the Greek capital market as our testing ground for investor sentiment is that closed-end funds over the 1997-2002 period were trading, on the average, at 7.55% premium and at 122.86% when the Athens stock market peaked in August 1999. Using a new dataset we also avoid the standard criticism that observed empirical regularities arise from data mining and expect to shed new light on whether investor sentiment is an important factor in asset pricing. 15 We find no evidence in support of the claim of Lee et al. (1991) that investor sentiment affects the risk of common stocks. Our results are consistent with the findings of Elton, Gruber, and Busse (1998) who show that investor sentiment does not enter the return generating process.
The fact that we failed to detect that investor sentiment in a capital market whose environment was expected to be more prone to investor sentiment provides additional support against the claim that investor sentiment represents an independent and systematic asset pricing risk. Our findings show that the sentiment factor does not enter the return generating process more frequently than a set of industry return indices, constructed in a similar way as the sentiment return index, which is used as a benchmark of comparison since they are not considered as systematic asset pricing factors.
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When we examine the pattern of return sensitivity to the sentiment factor across size portfolios and mutual funds (i.e., portfolios and funds that Lee et al.
(1991) argue are more sensitive to the sentiment factor because they have higher individual than institutional investor ownership) we find that sentiment has no influence on the returns of small stocks and mutual funds. Overall, we find no evidence supporting sentiment as an independent source of risk in the return generating process. The non-U.S. evidence not only contradicts the claim of Lee et al. (1991) that investor sentiment affects the risk of common stocks, it is also consistent with the findings of Elton et al. (1998) , indicating that investor sentiment does not enter the return generating process even in a market environment that is more likely to be influenced by investors sentiment than the U.S.. In contrast with the prediction of the investor sentiment hypothesis, our results refute the notion that risk premiums are affected by small investor sentiment.
13 See Elton, Gruber, and Busse (1998) for a similar testing procedure as well. GIASE is the General Index of ASE (GIASE). FTSE20 is an index of high capitalization companies, FTSE40 is an index of medium capitalization companies, PARALLEL is an index of small capitalization companies. BANK, INDUST, CONSTR and HOLD represent indices for the Banking, Industrial, Construction, and Holding industries, respectively. VWPR is the index of the monthly premium of Greek Closed-end funds and ΔVWPR is the index of changes in the monthly premium of Greek Closed-end funds. Table 6 Regression Results using widely Used Stock Market Indices Model 1: The time series relationship between monthly excess returns on three indices of ASE (FTSE20, FTSE40 and PARALLEL), changes in the monthly premium on a value-weighted portfolio of closed-end fund premiums (ΔVWPR), and the monthly excess return on the General Index of ASE (GIASE), which is used as a proxy for the market return (R mt ). FTSE20 is an index of large capitalization companies, FTSE40 is an index of medium capitalization companies and PARALLEL is an index of small capitalization companies. Model 2: The time series relationship between monthly excess returns on three indices of ASE, an index of changes in the monthly premium of Greek Closed-end funds (ΔVWPR), the monthly excess market return (GIASE), and excess returns on four sectoral indices of ASE (i.e., Banking (BANK), Industrial (INDUST), Construction (CONSTR), and Holding (HOLD)). The number of observations is 60 except for the second regression (FTSE40) where only 52 observations were available because the FTSE40 index was introduced September 1997 (i.e., 8 observations less). t-statistics are shown in parentheses. *Denotes statistical significance at the 5% level. Model 1: The time series relationship between monthly excess returns on three equally weighted size sorted portfolios of industrial stocks (LARGE CAP, MEDIUM CAP and SMALL CAP), changes in the monthly premium on a value-weighted portfolio of closed-end fund premiums (ΔVWPR), and the monthly excess return on the General Index of ASE (GIASE), which is used as a proxy for the market return (R mt ). Model 2: The time series relationship between monthly excess returns on three equally weighted size sorted portfolios of industrial stocks, an index of changes in the monthly premium of Greek Closed-end funds (ΔVWPR), the monthly excess market return (GIASE), and excess returns on four sectoral indices of ASE (i.e., Banking (BANK), Industrial (INDUST), Construction (CONSTR), and Holding (HOLD)). The number of observations is 60. t-statistics are shown in parentheses. *Denotes statistical significance at the 5% level. Model 1: The time series relationship between monthly excess returns on five equally weighted portfolios of industrial stocks sorted by market capitalization, changes in the monthly premium on a value weighted portfolio of closed-end fund premiums (ΔVWPR), and the monthly excess return on the General Index of ASE (GIASE) which is used as a proxy for the market return (R mt ). Model 2: The time series relationship between monthly excess returns on five equally weighted portfolios of industrial stocks sorted by market capitalization, an index of changes in the monthly premium of Greek Closed-end funds (ΔVWPR), the monthly excess market return (GIASE), and excess returns on four sectoral indices of ASE (i.e., Banking (BANK), Industrial (INDUST), Construction (CONSTR), and Holding (HOLD)). The number of observations is 60. t-statistics are shown in parentheses. *Denotes statistical significance at the 5% level.
Note: Portfolio, P1(LARGE) includes the 13 largest stocks of our sample, P2 includes the next 12 stocks, P3 includes the next 12 stocks, P4 includes the next 12 stocks and finally, P5 (SMALL) includes the smallest 13 stocks. 
